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 Thomas Demmelhuber 
The Euro-Mediterranean Space as an   
Imagined (Geo-)political, Economic    
and Cultural Entity 
1. Introduction 
The anger of Islamic societies world-wide that arose from the publication 
of caricatures featuring Prophet Muhammad has tempted various editors 
and scholars alike to declare the current situation as further evidence of 
Huntington’s thesis of the The Clash of Civilizations, predicted in 1993.
1 In 
this context the Mediterranean symbolizes a frontier between the secular-
liberal part on the Northern shore (Christian civilization) and the illiberal-
authoritarian part on the Southern shore (Islamic civilization) of the Medi-
terranean. The great legacy of the Mediterranean throughout history re-
mains undervalued. For centuries the Mediterranean has been the bridge 
between the actors on both sides, acting as a historic crossroads for various 
ethnic, cultural and religious traditions. It is more than odd “that only in 
modern times the Mediterranean clogged the flow of ideas” and stopped to 
act as “a vehicle for philosophies and cultures.”
2 Thus the aim of the fol-
 
The author would like to thank a number of people for their valuable contributions on 
the manuscript. Special thanks go to Bo Ram Kwon & Stefan Krompaß for their 
thoughts and suggestions. 
1   Huntington, Samuel P. (1993): “The Clash of Civilizations“. In: Foreign Affairs, 
3/1993. 
2   Arishie, Mohssen (2005): “Clash of labour – immigrants’ struggle in Europe”. In: 
The Egyptian Gazette, # 40,850, 126th year. December 6, 2005. Thomas Demmelhuber 
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lowing paper is to discuss the notion of the Euro-Mediterranean space
3 as a 
vivid and vibrant entity
4 in (geo-) political, economic and cultural terms. 
After the introductory remarks on the Mediterranean itself, the Euro-
Mediterranean space shall be evaluated as an imagined entity embodying 
historical, (geo-) political, economic and cultural dimensions. What were 
the constituting factors of this imagined entity? Additionally, the Barcelona 
Process (i.e. the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – EMP), which has 
shaped and defined the latter space, shall be reviewed in order to verify the 
crucial importance of the Euro-Mediterranean entity for the further devel-
opment of the EMP. 
1.1. The  Mediterranean 
The Mediterranean was not only the epicenter for the gamble of power 
throughout history
5, but it has also been the reference point from which to 
consider the world around and where to base transcending theories of man-
kind. The epicenter of civilization and its cradle was seen to be located in 
the Mediterranean for a very long time. In other words, the Mediterranean, 
 
3    Throughout this paper the author makes a difference between a Mediterranean 
space, embodying the littoral states of the Mediterranean sea basin and the much 
larger Euro-Mediterranean space, including the 25 EU members and the partner 
countries of the Southern Mediterranean within the Euro-Mediterranean partner-
ship, i.e. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Israel, 
Lebanon, Syria and Turkey. Both spaces are labeled as regions with sub-regions as 
integral parts of them. Sub-regions are considered as conceptual units which derive 
from a larger defined region. 
4   Besides further evaluations in the text, the term entity is generally defined as an area 
of common interests, experiences and legacies. There is diversity within one entity, 
signifying that there are several sub-structures within an “umbrella”. Though ac-
knowledging these sub-structures, they are inter-connected through the mutual rec-
ognition of common interests, experiences and legacies that may go beyond 
political, ethnic or religious boundaries. There may be a variety of different types of 
entities depending on the nature of the common sense. 
5   The author follows the argumentation of Karla Mallette as delivered in her fifth 
lecture (“Translations, Counterfeits, and Modern Mediterranean Literature”) in the 
Makdisi Literature Program in West Hall, cf. AUB Bulletin. August 2004, vol. 5, no. 
5. Beirut. The Euro-Mediterranean Space 
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as a practically closed lake, was the world arena in those days.
6 The Medi-
terranean image as a whole is neither completely occidental nor oriental. 
Moreover scholarly work in this field should avoid classifying the region in 
these terms. The terms Orient and Occident are both overloaded with 
stereotypes and false perceptions.
7 Despite its conflict-woven environment, 
the Mediterranean has not been a frontier. Since the Hellenic era the Medi-
terranean has been the medium to bridge the gap between other regions, 
different cultures and diverse tribes. In particular, the Eastern Mediterra-
nean must be seen as the historic crossroads for various ethnic, cultural and 
religious traditions.
8 Bridging a gap implies the existence of transitional 
areas. The latter have been midpoints of reference since the Hellenic era or 
the Roman Empire penetrated the Mediterranean region or at least large 
parts of it.
9 
If one looks at the term Mediterranean, which derives from the Latin word 
mediterraneus (“inland”), it tells us something about the importance of the 
region despite its different meanings in certain languages. The Mediterra-
nean experiences a variety of different names and meanings. Besides the 
Turkish and Arabic language that call the Mediterranean the White Sea
10, 
 
6   The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 marked the final end of this impression. It 
made the Mediterranean Sea a transit area for ships going from the West to the Far 
East and vice versa. 
7   Edward Said was one of the first to make explicit connections between Western 
colonization and images of the Muslim world. E. Said explains how apparently “ob-
jective” scholars from Europe or the Western hemisphere determined and taught 
academic dogmas about the so-called “inferior East”. These academic doctrines ac-
quired a certain aura of authority on the basis of their vast knowledge, and thus ac-
quired the power to misrepresent the Oriental world (with the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean as an integral part) to the Occidental audience and the power to 
speak for the Orient. Through those and other stereotypes, such dogmas found their 
way into academic circles which can have the power to guide and direct national 
policies (Said, Edward W. (1978): Orientalism. London). 
8 Cf. Calleya, Stephen C. (2000): “Is the Barcelona Process Working?” In: ZEI 
Discussion Papers C75, 2000. Bonn, p. 35. 
9   The author considers the latter as “Roman Rule”. The Romans penetrated the region 
with their imperial representatives and taxation more efficiently than ever before. 
10  Interestingly, Arabic adds the expression al-Mutawassit (“the Middle”) after bahr 
al-abyad (“White Sea”). The Turkish expression is Akdeniz. Ak stands for “white” 
and deniz for “sea”. Thomas Demmelhuber 
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the Romans referred to it as the Mare Nostrum, claiming the explicit own-
ership of the sea. In the Bible, it is titled the Great Sea or the Western Sea 
and modern Hebrew considers it as the Middle Sea, in relation to the Ger-
man equivalent Mittelmeer. The state of the art in literature provides defini-
tions about the Mediterranean space only in terms of a specific academic or 
thematic field. One may easily find the geographic definition of the Medi-
terranean as an entity for the passage of ships entering the area via the 
Isthmus of Suez and leaving it through the Strait of Gibraltar. The same 
accounts for tourism, a driving force for foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
most of the Mediterranean littoral states. In this context the Mediterranean 
is widely seen as one single entity covering a variety of destinations. Thus 
it seems that geography and some (cultural) stereotypes emanating from 
climate sustain the notion of the Mediterranean as a distinct cultural and 
ecological space.
11 
1.2. Inclusion  &  Exclusion 
The Mediterranean, as laid down before, is rather a bridge than a frontier. 
From a pluralist point of view, any political, economic or cultural approach 
to this transitional space (here: on behalf of the EU) implies to embark on 
the concepts of Inclusion and Exclusion.
12 The consequence is the devel-
opment of a contemporary Euro-Mediterranean peculiarity. There is some 
kind of a “contamination” between separated but interdependent (sub-) 
worlds in the region resulting in parts from Inclusion and Exclusion. Any 
negotiation on the definition of a common area implies to define the limits 
of this process (Exclusion). In other words, to define the area of a common 
entity, no matter in which term, means to define who will not be part of the 
game. In times of regionalism, with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
13 
 
11  The author remembers people saying that the Mediterranean stands for the region 
where olives are growing. Visual perception becomes a point of reference in these 
cases. 
12  This shall be a defining moment throughout this paper. 
13  EMP is the official name of the Barcelona Process. The EMP is a unique approach 
of the EU to the political, economic and social problems on the Southern shore of 
the Mediterranean. The partnership consists of three interdependent baskets (pillars) 
standing for a political & security, economic & financial and social, cultural & hu-The Euro-Mediterranean Space 
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as one result of it, the dichotomy of Inclusion and Exclusion has not van-
ished at all. For instance, the two documents of the EMP
14 emphasize the 
need for free markets and the creation of a common area of peace and 
prosperity (Inclusion), but eventually curb labor mobility. Exclusion is 
therefore a blueprint for drafting bilateral agreements in order to shunt for-
eign workers or asylum seekers from the Southern Mediterranean and 
across Africa back home. The latter sustains the notion of separated but 
somehow interdependent (sub-) worlds.
15 
1.3.  Entity rather than Identity 
The currently perceived strategic and (geo-) political reality of the Euro-
Mediterranean space is one of structural fragmentation. Although it would 
be a far-fetched invention to speak of a Euro-Mediterranean identity, there 
is no reason to reject it completely.
16 Further fragmentation would only re-
sult in constructing the Euro-Mediterranean as no more than a space of sub-
regions without any unified reference of identity. People can have different 
and varying identities that have influence on them in different ways. Gen-
erating identities is somehow a psychological necessity of mankind. What 
does the term identity imply? There is a variety of identities which may re-
 
man partnership. This new regional approach of the 1990s resulted among others 
from geographic proximity, the new role of the EU as a global actor, a new stage of 
world politics after the end of the Cold War and from the misperception that the 
Middle East Conflict between the Arab World and Israel is on a one-way path to-
wards peace. 
14  External Relations DG: “Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean 
Conference, 27-28/11/95”. In: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euro 
med/bd.htm , (March 19, 2006). 
15   The EU has recently begun to acknowledge the complexity of migration: “The 
European Council notes the increasing importance of migration issues for the EU 
and its Member States and the fact that recent developments have led to mounting 
public concern in some Member States. It underlines the need for a balanced, global 
and coherent approach, covering policies to combat illegal immigration and, in 
cooperation with third countries, harnessing the benefits of legal migration.” 
(Presidency Conclusions: “Brussels European Council 15/16 December 2005”. In: 
EuropeAid Cooperation Office DG (ed.; 2005): Euromed Report. Issue 93. 
Brussels). 
16  Aliboni, Robert (2004): “Inventing a cooperative identity”. In: Middle East Round-
table, ed. 4, vol. 2/2004, p. 2. Thomas Demmelhuber 
8   
fer to ethnic, class or religious identities. Identity can be understood as the 
consciousness of certain groups of people to separate themselves from one 
another and to follow this pattern over a period of time. Identity is therefore 
deeply influenced by notions of individuality, continuity and consistency. 
National identity is still something completely different as it goes beyond 
the latter notions. It may evolve on the basis of the identities just men-
tioned. This distinctiveness of national identity must be kept in mind.
17 
Certainly, the Mediterranean does not constitute a truly common identity. 
The same accounts for the much larger Euro-Mediterranean space. Its 
members do not share one cultural tradition, language, religion or recent 
history of administrative unity. Its political systems cover a wide range 
from liberal democracy to authoritarian rule.
18 Nonetheless, the latter shall 
not be the defining moment for the Euro-Mediterranean space. Keeping in 
mind that the Euro-Mediterranean identity still has to be invented, to be 
established based on an existing small common denominator, the feeling, 
the idea and the awareness of a specific Euro-Mediterranean entity (to be 
evaluated later) is existent. The idea of such an entity was an absolute pre-
requisite from the EU’s perspective to launch a common approach to the 
Mediterranean in the early 1990s.
19 
Looking at the EU’s partner countries on the Southern shore and in particu-
lar in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Euro-Mediterranean idea
20 implies an 
indirect perception that contrasts with the nationalist idea because it under-
scores common denominators across political, ethnic or religious bounda-
 
17  Greenfeld, Liah (1992): Nationalism - five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, Mass., 
p. 12-14. 
18  Heller, Mark A. (2004): “The Mediterranean of the imagination”. In: Middle East 
Roundtable, ed. 4, vol. 2/2004, p. 4. 
19  In the 1990s, fear was one of the defining moments for both sides to embark on this 
new concept. For the EU countries the fear of so-called soft risks such as migration, 
Islamic fundamentalism and drug trafficking was of high importance. For the coun-
tries on the Southern shore it was the fear of a fortress Europe after the initial deci-
sion for the Eastern enlargement that made the governments of the region agree on 
the EU’s proposal for a partnership and embark on the Euro-Mediterranean project 
(cf. FN 34). 
20  Understood as an awareness of a Euro-Mediterranean common denominator e.g. in 
terms of common matters of concern. The Euro-Mediterranean Space 
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ries. These patterns supporting the Euro-Mediterranean idea exist though 
not being officially recognized as they directly challenge the ideology of 
Arab unity or any single state-nationalism.
21 Since the adoption of the 
European model of nationalism as the most successful tool of political mo-
bilization, any confession to Arab unity is outweighed by the practical po-
litical behaviour, which defends individual national interests.
22 Therefore, 
the notion of Arab unity and the local specifics of state-nationalism chal-
lenge the notion of a Euro-Mediterranean entity. 
Existing Euro-Mediterranean ideas do not imply that there is a Euro-
Mediterranean identity, but interdependent constellations of sub-regions 
connecting EU-Europe with the Mediterranean do mean a common entity 
that make them areas of common approach.
23 The entity is existent. It may 
be girded by the framework of common institutions, the feeling of co-
ownership for common problems of the Euro-Mediterranean region. The 
notion of identity is still something stronger that may develop in the fu-
ture.
24 Insofar, to avoid misperceptions on both sides, one should refer to a 
substantial Mediterranean entity which is a historical and cultural acquis 
and in case of the EMP to a virtually (new) political, economic and cultural 
entity that converted the Euro-Mediterranean idea into reality. The Medi-
terranean entity remains an integral part of the larger Euro-Mediterranean 
entity. 
 
 
21  Further information on the dichotomy of state-nationalism and pan-Arab unity cf. 
Philipp, Thomas (1994): „Nationale Einheit und politische Mehrstaatlichkeit der 
Araber in der Gegenwart.“ In: Lüsebrink, Hans-Jürgen (ed.; 1994): Nationalismus 
im Mittelmeerraum. Baden-Baden, p. 114-129. 
22  Even the great advocate of Arab Nationalism, the former Egyptian president Nasser, 
was a hidden Egyptian nationalist who supported the idea of Arab unity insofar that 
Egypt played the leading role in it. In other words, the verbal notions of Arab unity 
only served as a tool to enhance and increase its legitimacy in domestic and regional 
politics. 
23  Cf. FN 3 & 4. 
24  Constructivist approach to International Relations, cf. Wendt, Alexander (1992): 
“Anarchy is what States make of it. The Social Construction of Power in World 
Politics”. In: International Organisations, vol. 46 (3), p. 393-404. Thomas Demmelhuber 
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2.   Genesis and Opportunities of the Euro-
Mediterranean Space as an Imagined Entity 
2.1.  Imagined Communities – Theorizing the Euro-Mediterranean 
Entity 
Looking at various works of well-known scholars in the field of national-
ism, it is easy to find a theoretical background for the idea of a Euro-
Mediterranean entity. The Euro-Mediterranean entity and the principal idea 
of the nation (though leading to different results) have much in common. 
Following the esteemed works of Benedict Anderson
25, every nation, i.e. 
every entity larger than a village, is based on imagination. Thus, Anderson 
considers each nation as an imagined society. This idea may be used as 
founding principle for any further evaluation of the Euro-Mediterranean 
entity as well. The latter is an imagined but limited community with well 
defined boundaries in which the construction of the entity is primarily de-
pendent on the work of political elites. The driving forces behind the foster-
ing of entities are political, socioeconomic and cultural features. These 
thoughts apply for the evaluation of the Euro-Mediterranean entity and 
shall lay a theoretical foundation. 
2.2  The Mediterranean Entity– a Transnational Creature through-
out History 
The main thesis of the Mediterranean entity is that it has been a transna-
tional phenomenon throughout history. One must also remember that it has 
been in parts a unified political entity through empires.
26 It has implied a 
reordering of the binary cultural, social and epistemological distinctions of 
the modern period. Since the early beginning, there have been types of enti-
ties that were not constrained by national, ethnic or religious boundaries, 
such as transnational corporation, scientific interactions or migration in 
both directions. This does not say that it was a static entity. The awareness 
 
25  Anderson, Benedict (1996): The imagined communities. Reflections on the origin 
and spread of nationalism. London. 
26  E.g.: Alexandrine, Roman or Byzantine Empire. The Euro-Mediterranean Space 
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of an entity was adapted to the Zeitgeist of each era. Real entities – not en-
forced ones – are vibrant and vivid.
27 They appear and may disappear 
again. Entities are assigned and accepted, withheld and rejected. This is the 
opportunity of the larger Euro-Mediterranean entity to evolve and to de-
velop further with the legacy of the Mediterranean entity as an integral part. 
The next sections shall work out the distinctions between the historical 
Mediterranean entity and the larger, unprecedented Euro-Mediterranean 
entity with the 25 EU members being an integral part in it. 
2.3.  Policy Making on the Mediterranean 
In order to say more about the genesis and opportunities of the Euro-
Mediterranean space as an imagined entity in terms of history, (geo-) poli-
tics and culture, one has to clarify that the “power game” for the Mediter-
ranean has marked the development of a Mediterranean entity and its 
diverse sub-entities for centuries. Since 1798 the major player in this 
“power game” had been Europe with Napoleon Bonaparte claiming to 
bring revolutionary values and civilization to the Egyptian people.
28 
Throughout the 19
th century until the waging of World War II, the Euro-
pean powers were the defining external actors in the whole Mediterranean 
giving the Ottoman Empire just the role of a regional puppet. After World 
War II, the US and the Soviet Union emerged as the new powerful actors in 
the “power game” for the Mediterranean with the US being the remaining 
one in this position until now. After Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and 
the US-brokered peace process between Israel and its neighbouring coun-
tries, American policymakers were actively engaged in Middle East diplo-
macy. Despite the essential part played by Norwegian interlocutors in Oslo 
I & II and the role that the EU played (financial support of the MEPP), the 
US State Department remained uncomfortable with the idea of a more bal-
anced, transatlantic approach to the peace process. This discomfort re-
flected a natural desire for control and concentration of effort in Middle 
 
27  The author follows the constructivist approach to international relations, cf. FN 24. 
28  Not to forget that the European gambling for the Western Mediterranean had begun 
100 years earlier culminating in the seizure of Gibraltar as a unique strategic asset 
by the Royal Navy of Great Britain. Thomas Demmelhuber 
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East diplomacy together with a widely shared American unease about a 
larger and presumably more pro-Arab role for the EU. 
Through its geographic vicinity the EU was forced to adapt to its 
neighbouring countries in the South in a different and more multi-
dimensional way than, e.g. the US was willing to. Geographic proximity 
has equipped European strategies with a more sensitive, more complete and 
more long-term approach to security and socio-economic issues in the 
Middle East. Beginning with the Global Mediterranean Policy in the 1970s 
and the Euro-Arab-Dialogue, the EU (EC at that time) attempted to develop 
the capability of a coherent foreign policy actor to operate independently 
from the US in the region. It still took years to make a change in this situa-
tion and to advance from the “payer” to the “player”, i.e. from an observer 
status (Madrid Conference in 1991) to an equal partner in the so-called 
Quartet promoting the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP).
29 The fall of the 
iron curtain marked the beginning of a new step in world politics enabling 
the EU to advance to a more independent actor on the international stage 
and to embark on the effort to fill the institutional vacuum in the Mediter-
ranean by creating the EMP in 1995.
30 In accordance with the enhanced 
foreign and security policy dimension (CFSP) contemplated in the treaty of 
Amsterdam 1997
31, the Vienna European Council in December 1998 de-
cided to devise a common strategy for four areas, which ranked high in the 
Union’s foreign policy priorities.
32 In the case of the Common Strategy on 
the Mediterranean (June 2000)
33, the EU reiterates the acquis of the EMP 
 
29  The four parties in the Quartet are: USA, Russia, the EU & the UN. 
30  The EU simply had no institutional framework to tackle the region as a whole. 
There were numerous bilateral agreements that were still marked by preferential re-
lations between the former colonies and France and Great Britain, respectively. The 
EU had its difficulties to get involved into regional dynamics. The almost 20-year-
old Euro-Arab Dialogue failed. In particular Spain, France and Italy pushed hard for 
a new unprecedented and innovative approach to the region. 
31  The initial beginning of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (second pillar of 
TEU) took place with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. 
32  Cf. Presidency Conclusions: “Vienna European Council, 12-13 December 1998”. 
In:  http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00300-R1.EN8.htm  , 
(November 10, 2005). 
33   Cf. EU-CFSP Document (2000/458/CFSP): “Common Strategy of the European 
Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean region”. In: http://europa.eu.int The Euro-Mediterranean Space 
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and the furtherance of the Barcelona process. It shall form the basis of its 
more long-term approach in order to create an area of peace, stability and 
wealth. 
In sum, policy making on certain regions has a substantial influence on the 
genesis of entities. The policy of the EU on the Mediterranean has had a 
defining impact on the formation of a Euro-Mediterranean entity.
34 In case 
of the latter entity, (geo-) political, economic and cultural settings had a 
substantial influence on the formation of a Euro-Mediterranean entity. 
2.4.   Geo-political Settings 
There is a clear distinction between the Mediterranean as a whole and the 
newly constructed Euro-Mediterranean entity including the 25 EU member 
states and Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey, Palestinian Authority, 
Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan of the partner countries in the Mediterra-
nean.
35 Mauritania has an observer status as well as Libya, although the 
latter is supposed to become a EMP member soon if it accepts the acquis of 
the Barcelona Declaration. 
It is somehow difficult to consider the Euro-Mediterranean entity from a 
geo-political point of view as a coherent whole without mentioning the 
fractures which divide it. Looking at the Euro-Mediterranean region from 
the stage of international politics, two outstanding prominent international 
regions are seen outside of those EU member states that are no littoral 
states of the Mediterranean. On the one hand, the North-Western sector of 
the Mediterranean as part of the EU and on the other hand the South-
Eastern flank of the basin, which is labeled the Near East. Both regions 
should be further subdivided into four sub-regions, namely: Southern 
Europe, the Balkan (both North-Western sector), the Maghrib and the 
 
/comm/external_relations/euromed/common_strategy_med_en.pdf , (November 10, 
2005). 
34  The heterogeneous structure of the Arab counterparts in the Southern Mediterranean 
has made it difficult for the latter to advance to an equal actor, compared to the 
more unified, more institutionalized and in financial terms more powerful foreign 
policy actor on the Northern shore (EU). 
35  Cf. FN 3. Thomas Demmelhuber 
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Mashriq (both South-Eastern (Western) sector). They all have regional spe-
cifics that make it necessary to implement a Mediterranean policy based on 
sub-regional findings.
36 
Primarily, this does not explain why the EU decided to exclude countries 
like Albania or Croatia from the partnership. Indeed there is a political con-
sensus to declare, e.g., Albania as a Mediterranean country but that has its 
primary roots in the Balkan. In the mid-1990s the Balkan itself was a re-
gion of severe crisis leading to a different EU, i.e. transatlantic approach. 
Geo-political as the term says has not only a geographic dimension but also 
a political dimension that may alter the geographic definition. This explains 
the inclusion of Jordan in the EMP. It is not a Mediterranean country but its 
important role in the Near East and hereby especially in the Middle East 
Peace Process made Jordan part of a Euro-Mediterranean entity. Jordan 
was supposed to play a constructive part in the genesis of the evolving 
Euro-Mediterranean entity. In sum, geographic regions, however fractured 
they may be, are altered by politics. New geo-political entities appear and 
new identities may emerge in the long run. 
2.5. Economic  Dimensions:  Geo-economic Realities 
By 2010 the EU shall be the biggest single market and the world’s most 
concentrated area of economic prosperity and internal stability with an es-
timated 500 million people. This coincides with the declared aim to finalize 
the Mediterranean Free-Trade Area (MFTA) by 2010. The majority of 
Mediterranean countries on the Southern shore are dependent on European 
markets and foreign direct investments. If they want to increase their ability 
to penetrate the global market with competitive products they must diver-
sify and improve their export capabilities. The bilateral trade between 
Mediterranean countries and the EU shall open the way for free trade 
among the Mediterranean countries themselves, as the latest promising 
achievements with the Agadir Agreement
37 have shown. Hereby, infra-
 
36  Ibid. 
37  Free trade agreement between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan. It includes cus-
toms, services, certificates of origin, government purchases, financial dealings, pre-
ventive measures, intellectual property, standards and specifications, anti-dumping The Euro-Mediterranean Space 
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structure development constitutes the key factor in increasing the economic 
competitiveness of the Euro-Mediterranean entity as a whole but in particu-
lar of the countries on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean. In the sec-
tors of transport, energy and telecommunications, regional programmes 
under the EMP, i.e. financed by MEDA
38, bring together policymakers and 
experts to exchange and co-ordinate strategies and may ease regulatory en-
vironments. 
Indeed, there are economic reasons for the EU and the partner countries in 
the Southern Mediterranean to embark on this concept. The Euro-
Mediterranean entity as an arena of common trade can be essential in im-
proving the economic indicators across the region. The prospective free 
trade area might be a promising milestone for the Euro-Mediterranean en-
tity to develop further. At present, with the bilateral association agreements 
between the EU and the partner countries signed and ratified (except 
Syria), there is still an overwhelming lack of intraregional trade.
39 More-
 
and mechanisms to resolve conflicts. The Free Trade Zone will make up a market of 
more than 100 million people and a combined domestic product of nearly € 150 bil-
lion (for full details: Jordan Embassy to the US (2004): “Agreement for the Estab-
lishment of a Free Trade Zone between the Arabic Mediterranean Nations”. In: 
http://www.jordanembassyus.org/new/commercial/fta/agadir.pdf , December 11, 
2005) 
38  MEDA stands for Mésures d’accompagnement financiers et techniques. It is the 
main financial tool in the Barcelona Process under the auspice of the European In-
vestment Bank (EIB). 
39  Besides the low intraregional integration we see a resurrection of national values, 
national integrity and local nationalism. Intraregional co-operation such as the Arab 
League reveals only minor actors showing hardly any impact on matters of decisive 
political, strategic and economic importance. There is an overwhelming need to 
boost South-South integration. This is a prerequisite for any free trade to succeed 
and to avoid the so-called “hub and spokes”-effect between the EU and its bilateral 
dominated economic ties with the partner countries. There are positive signs. After 
a long estrangement, some Arab economies are currently rediscovering the lucrative 
asset of intraregional trade. Commercial ties and performance within the Middle 
East, the most sluggish among the world’s trading blocs, are showing signs of 
steady revival (cf. Glain, Stephen (2006): “Selling to the Neighbors”. In: Newsweek, 
February 27, 2006, p. 44 p.; Zorob, Anja (2005): „Die Euro-Mediterrane Partner-
schaft und die Süd-Süd-Integration”. In: Orient, 46. Jg., 3/2005. Hamburg, p. 492-
508). Thomas Demmelhuber 
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over, these opportunities are definitely dependent on the successful further-
ance of the (geo-) political entity. 
2.6.   Cultural Stage – Mediterranean vs. Euro-Mediterranean Entity 
The Mediterranean entity has been a defining centre of world history for 
many centuries. Scholars of nationalism tell us that a common basis for a 
nation, a unity of people or any other entity may be a common history or 
experience. As the great French 19
th century scholar on nationalism Ernest 
Renan emphasized, they must have much in common so that they may also 
include a common approach to forget certain aspects.
40 In other words there 
have to be one or several defining moments in history that bind those peo-
ple together. Regarding the Mediterranean entity, these values have been 
developed basically through trade and exchange across the sea but also re-
ligion, language and customs (e.g.: urban organization & food culture). The 
Mediterranean has been the birthplace of cities and urban cultures. It is ac-
knowledged that the history of the region was vibrant and has witnessed 
extensive cultural exchange. The Mediterranean is the basin of multiple 
civilizations. The historic achievements, the interaction between various 
leading actors in which Arab scholars translated Greek works and created 
the possibility for Europe’s era of Enlightenment. It took centuries for 
Europe to finally realize and recognize the importance of Greek works and 
to keep up pace with Arab scholars in all fields of science.
41 
This great legacy
42 of the Mediterranean as a whole, even if it is subject to 
different actors, stands for a common heritage.
43 Through this exchange – 
 
40  Renan, Ernest (1882): «Qu’est-ce qu’ une nation?» In: Œuvres Complètes, vol. I, 
1947-61.Paris, p. 892. 
41  A great insight in the areas of interaction in the Middle Ages through the translation 
of Greek works by Arab scholars and the later adoption of European scholars can be 
read in: Endreß, Gerhard (2002): „Der Islam und die Einheit des mediterranen Kul-
turraums im Mittelalter”. In: Masala, Carlo (ed.; 2002): Der Mittelmeerraum – 
Brücke oder Grenze? Baden-Baden, p. 9-31. 
42  Braudel, Fernand: „Mediterrane Welt“. In: Braudel, Fernand (ed; 1987): Die Welt 
des Mittelmeers. Frankfurt am Main, p. 7-10. 
43  Thousands of Greeks and Italians were living in Alexandria (Egypt). Arabs con-
quered Spain and stayed there for a very long time, which had sustainable influence 
on Spanish culture, still visible in contemporary times. The Ottomans were every-The Euro-Mediterranean Space 
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no matter for what reason – certain values became common and this had a 
defining impact on the development of the region at the macro and micro 
scales. For centuries, the Mediterranean was the bridge between the actors 
on both sides of it. It is more than curious “that only in modern times the 
Mediterranean clogged the flow of ideas” and stopped to act as “a vehicle 
for philosophies and cultures.”
44 Some defining moments changed the 
situation and developed the impression of a bipolar Mediterranean. 
For a long time European history evolved from the Mediterranean. With 
the discovery of North America, European penetration of far-away regions 
began and the consequences of industrial modernization surfaced, and soon 
the Mediterranean was left behind. It just became another region subject to 
European influence. To follow the thoughts of Carlo Masala, the former 
cosmopolitan Mediterranean, once seen as the bridge between cultures and 
civilizations, was transformed into a bipolar region, in which the North 
separated itself from the South in political, economic and cultural terms. 
The Mediterranean was seen as frontier
45 not as an original unity with dif-
fering faces as described by Fernand Braudel. Despite this bipolar notion, 
the cultural stage – being the dimension that may give us a sense of a 
common past – remained a bridge between Europe and the Mediterranean 
and has been used regularly in order to create legitimacy. Long before the 
birth of the EMP, academic circles in Israel embarked on the idea of the 
Euro-Mediterranean entity as a way of resolving Israel’s isolation that was 
imposed (but often self-imposed as well) from the Arab world. In order to 
create the virtual connection to European cultural affinities, one had to face 
geographic obstacles, but the idea of the Euro-Mediterranean created op-
portunities for allowing the Jewish state to be “of Europe”. It was one at-
tempt to bridge the Sephardic-Ashkenazi cultural gap. Despite the bipolar 
notion of the Mediterranean, the idea of a Euro-Mediterranean entity did 
not vanish. Due to the existence of a common Mediterranean sensitivity or 
 
where in the Eastern Mediterranean. France penetrated the Levant. The rest of the 
Near East and North Africa experienced colonial penetration by the United King-
dom or Italy. 
44  Arishie: “Clash of labour – immigrants’ struggle in Europe”. 
45  The rich and highly developed North and the impoverished South. Thomas Demmelhuber 
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culture and its existence with local variations and particularities, the idea of 
the Euro-Mediterranean entity can be described as a re-emerging idea. With 
the EMP, the EU and the partner countries in the South have adopted this 
idea. The idea became reality as integral part of a political, economic and 
cultural concept. The next step works out the objectives of the EMP in 
terms of the Euro-Mediterranean entity. 
2.7.  Objectives of the Barcelona Process 
2.7.1. Ten Years of Partnership – an Assessment  
Starting with the Barcelona Process in 1995, the EU and its Mediterranean 
partners have embarked on an ambitious project, in order to improve mu-
tual understanding by promoting political, cultural exchanges and fostering 
trade. The ambition was to create a greater understanding among the major 
religions present in the region. It was hoped to bring greater mutual toler-
ance, co-operation and enhance the awareness of a common heritage. The 
Mediterranean was seen as the symbol of coexistence between cultures and 
traditions. Besides the priority given to the first and second pillar of the 
EMP (political & economic issues), the third pillar (social, cultural & hu-
man affairs) remains crucial for the task to create an area of mutual under-
standing. At the beginning, any approach comprising the third pillar had to 
face severe obstacles. Especially during the first decade of the Barcelona 
Process, the third pillar was widely seen in critical terms. Scholars claimed 
that the third pillar was not a panacea and stressed the danger of giving im-
petus to neo-colonial reactions by the partner countries in the South.
46 
Many claimed that it was only included in the EMP to follow the experi-
ence of the CSCE process launched in Helsinki 1975. 
The year 2001, with its lasting impact of terrorist attacks on US mainland, 
changed world politics substantially. Regarding the EMP, the events of the 
year 2001 boosted the third pillar as it was soon a common perception in 
EU-Europe and the Mediterranean that it must be a major task to avoid any 
 
46  Philipp Morris Institute for Public Policy Research (1998): Is the Barcelona Proc-
ess working?  EU policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Conference Proceedings 
Athens, April 2-3, 1998, p. 26-29. The Euro-Mediterranean Space 
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clash of civilization. Why is the third pillar of the EMP so crucial for the 
Euro-Mediterranean entity to thrive? As laid down in the last few pages, 
the (geo-) political and economic reasons to embark on this new concept 
rallied around interests, intentions and objectives with hardly any reference 
to a common legacy in the past. The third pillar, embracing social, human 
and cultural affairs, is substantially built on the Euro-Mediterranean entity 
as an awareness of a common past and legacy. Euro-Mediterranean cul-
tures, religions, sciences and traditions evolved from the Mediterranean. 
This is the common denominator on which to build on, to base interaction, 
to foster the Euro-Mediterranean entity and eventually to realize the (geo-) 
political and economic objectives. The intended interaction, especially re-
ferring to social, human and cultural affairs within the Euro-Mediterranean 
entity, is getting visible. Euro-Mediterranean affairs are not only on the 
agenda of politics and economics. Parallel events take place in academic 
circles. Mediterranean centres are established, conferences on Mediterra-
nean identity are held and scientific interaction is enhanced. The latest 
achievement in this respect is the launching of a Master Programme in 
Euro-Mediterranean Affairs by the network of Mediterranean universities 
and other academic institutions.
47 
2.7.2. Looking Ahead 
Despite the failures and problems of the EMP, the Euro-Mediterranean en-
tity is the only and the most suitable bi- and multilateral forum that can 
tackle the most pressing problems in the region. There is simply no alterna-
tive on behalf of the EU. The EU has to overcome the misfits of the Barce-
lona Process in order to create the basis for the Euro-Mediterranean entity 
to strengthen further. The same is valid vice versa. With a strengthened 
Euro-Mediterranean entity the problems and conflicts of the region may be 
tackled and eased in the short run. A strengthened Euro-Mediterranean en-
tity builds confidence which in the long run can have a decisive impact on 
conflict solution. As mentioned before, (id-) entities are not static. There is 
a steady development. Each (id-) entity, however imagined it is, is subject 
 
47  For further information cf. EuropeAid Cooperation Office DG (ed.): Euromed Syn-
opsis. A Weekly Newsletter on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the MEDA 
Programme. No. 345, 2 March 2006. Brussels. Thomas Demmelhuber 
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to change. (Id-) entity can be written and rewritten. It is a constant pro-
gress, vital and vibrant. Starting in 1995 and with many scholars giving the 
third pillar only a minor importance, it is now among the most crucial pat-
terns of the EMP as it can foster the Euro-Mediterranean entity, which is 
indispensable for a successful development of the first and second pillar of 
the EMP. 
3.  Summary of Arguments 
The Euro-Mediterranean entity - defined by the Euro-Mediterranean Part-
nership as a new political, economic and cultural concept - is not only a 
single reference of correspondence such as the sea basin. It is a dialectical 
notion of an intercultural approach between EU-Europe and the Mediterra-
nean. One has to differentiate between identity and entity. In terms of the 
EMP it is appropriate to speak of a Euro-Mediterranean entity in order to 
avoid the stronger notion of identity, which may evolve in the future. Cur-
rently, it is difficult to back the argument of a Mediterranean identity and 
even more difficult to outline the argument of a Euro-Mediterranean iden-
tity. 
The cultural and historical acquis of the Mediterranean entity is an integral 
part of the Euro-Mediterranean entity. Following the theory of nationalism 
any (id-) entity people are referring to is imagined. Entities cover common 
spaces where Inclusion and Exclusion are defining aspects in shaping the 
space. There is diversity within one entity, signifying that there are several 
sub-structures within an “umbrella”. Therefore the Euro-Mediterranean 
specificity of a “contamination” of different but interdependent worlds 
could develop. Policy making on certain regions has a substantial impact 
on the genesis of (id-) entities. The policy of the EU on the Mediterranean 
has had a defining impact on the formation of a Euro-Mediterranean entity 
with the whole EU being an integral part of it. Thus, it was the EU and to a 
lesser degree the partner countries in the South who re-defined the Mediter-
ranean and converted the pre-existing idea of a Euro-Mediterranean entity 
following (geo-) political, (socio-) economic and cultural reasons into real-
ity. The Euro-Mediterranean entity is beneficial as an opportunity for in-The Euro-Mediterranean Space 
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creased understanding among peoples and cultural exchange. The third pil-
lar provides the most promising tools to foster the Euro-Mediterranean en-
tity because it builds on a common past and heritage. A fostered entity is 
indispensable for the first and second pillar. The Report by the High-Level 
Advisory Group (established by the President of the EU Commission 
Romano Prodi in 2002) emphasizes the last argument: 
“If, on the other hand, we all resolve to meet this challenge head on, in 25 years 
the people of both shores of the Mediterranean will form a human and economic 
community united by their common destiny and capable of making a lasting 
mark on history. Globalisation would not then breed marginalization and the 
frustration and loss of identity this can engender.”
48 
In other words, history of a certain entity does not simply happen. It is 
something that has to be made by the people and their representatives 
which constitute the latter. 
 
48  High-Level Advisory Group (2003): “Dialogue Between People and Cultures in the 
Euro-Mediterranean Area”. In: EuropeAid Cooperation Office DG (ed.; 2003): Eu-
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